Archives for May 18, 2016

Distribution of Lifetime Returns for Individual US Stocks, 1989-2015

overunderachievers

Have an individual stock idea brewing the in the back of your mind? Perhaps the recent LendingClub drama has you itching to buy a few shares of LC at under $5 a share? Above is an interesting chart that shows the distribution of total returns for individual stocks when compared to the S&P 500 index (1989-2015). It was created by Longboard Asset Management, found via Abnormal Returns.

We analyzed 14,455 active stocks between 1989 and 2015, identifying the best performing stocks on both an annualized return and total return basis. Looking at total returns of individual stocks, 1,120 stocks (7.7% of all active stocks) outperformed the S&P 500 Index by at least 500% during their lifetimes. Likewise, 976 stocks (6.8% of all active stocks) lagged the S&P 500 by at least 500%. The remaining 12,404 stocks performed above, at or below the same level as the S&P 500.

I felt that this chart shows you the psychological risks of investing in individual stocks. I’ve been dipping my toes back into individual stock investing with a very small portion of my portfolio. My general idea is to invest in some high-quality, dividend-earning stocks and thus being able to earn those dividends without paying the expense ratio of an ETF. I’d also avoid some tax-efficiency issues if I am able to hold them for very long periods as opposed to a dividend ETF that keeps changing the components of their underlying index. Here’s one of my inspirations. In other words: Buy good stocks, hold them forever.

But as the chart above shows, some of your picks will do great, and some will do horribly. Some people will tell you about their “ten-baggers” and neglect to mention the losers, while the final math will show you lagging the index. As active investors, Longboard concludes that you should focus on avoiding the underperforming assets. But I’d be wary of being so careful about avoiding losers that they miss out on the winners. (The winners often look like losers at some point… can you say Apple?)

Even if you just plan on make a few trades here and here, individual stock investing is a mental sport that takes self-discipline and a calm rationality. Very few people have the characteristics needed, even when managing their own money with no management fee drag. Charlie Munger has his own take, but also admits that only a small percentage can add value:

I think a select few – a small percentage of the investment managers – can deliver value added. But I don’t think brilliance alone is enough to do it. I think that you have to have a little of this discipline of calling your shots and loading up – if you want to maximize your chances of becoming one who provides above average real returns for clients over the long pull.

[…] I think it’s hard to provide a lot of value added to the investment management client, but it’s not impossible.

LendingClub Drama: Should Investor-Lenders Be Scared of Bankruptcy?

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As an early adopter and IPO participant of LendingClub, I was disappointed to read about their recent happenings. The major financial media outlets have been covering it closely, with summary-style articles from the NYT here and WSJ here. This is my condensed understanding of the situation.

  • On Monday, May 9th, LendingClub abruptly announced in a “by the way” manner that their celebrity CEO Renaud Laplanche had resigned. (His only other alternative was to be fired.) Three other high-level executives were also fired.
  • LendingClub improperly sold $22 million of loans to an institutional investor that did not meet the investor’s standards. The origination dates were changed some loans in order to make the loan meet the investor’s specifications. Other loans had other features of their disclosures altered and/or misrepresented. LendingClub later bought the loans back for full price.
  • LendingClub as a company decided that it was good idea to invest in outside investment funds that own… LendingClub notes. Can you say conflict of interest? Will the fund get better access to loans? LendingClub was supposed to be the middleman, so why are they quietly taking on risk as the lender?
  • For one of these funds that LendingClub invested in, then-CEO Laplanche had a personal stake which he did not disclose. Director John Mack also had a personal stake, which apparently was disclosed. So now LendingClub as company is investing in outside funds that invest in LendingClub notes and are (shhh) partially owned by their CEOs and Directors?
  • On Tuesday, May 17th, an SEC filing disclosed that LendingClub received a grand jury subpoena from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), which indicates they will be subject to additional investigations as well as potential lawsuits in the future.

When LendingClub started out a peer-to-peer lender, the grand idea was that the spread that banks got between taking deposits and making loans would be made thinner, with the difference going to individuals, NOT Wall Street. Individual borrowers got loans at lower rates. Individual lenders got paid higher interest. An illustration from their own materials:

lcdrama_spread

In opinion, LendingClub then became too aggressive in their chase to stay on top as the “industry leader”. The majority of their notes are now sold to large, institutional investors, not individuals. But this also means risk if the big investors decide to stop buying their big chunks of loans. In turn, they loosened their standards and became willing to take on additional risk by essentially buying their own loans if demand drops. You can decide if it was coincidence that they started fudging dates and other “little stuff” to keep things going.

Finally, another way that LendingClub was aggressive is that they pursued a way to allow them to sell notes in all 50 states called a “blue sky exemption”. However, by doing it this way, they could not create a “bankruptcy remote vehicle” where individual note-holders were protected in case of a LendingClub bankruptcy. This is another way where the individual investor is not their #1 concern. Here’s the official statement from the LendingClub website (emphasis mine):

When you invest in a Note, you are investing in an obligation of Lending Club. Borrowers make payments on their loans to Lending Club, and in turn, Lending Club distributes payments to investors in the Notes net of fees. If Lending Club were to go out of business, investors may not receive the full amount of payments due and to become due on the Note, or such payments may be delayed as bankruptcy or other proceedings make their way through the courts.

We have taken steps to ensure continuity to protect investors and borrowers if Lending Club were to go out of business. For example, we have executed a backup and successor servicing agreement with Portfolio Financial Servicing Company (“PFSC”). Under this agreement, PFSC stands ready to service borrower loans.

Following five business days’ prior written notice from us or from the indenture trustee for the Notes, PFSC will begin servicing the loans. If the underlying loans are determined to be part of Lending Club’s bankruptcy estate, PFSC may not be able to make payments on the Notes. If our agreement with PFSC were to be terminated, we would seek to replace PFSC with another backup servicer.

Here’s another take by Kaddhim Shubber in a FT article.

The short answer is that yes, there is a chance that if LendingClub files bankruptcy that investors individual notes may lose their principal and/or interest if other creditors claim priority over those assets. The question is determining the probability of this happening.

Why an acquisition is much more likely than bankruptcy. If I am reading their recent filings correctly, LendingClub has over $800 million in cash along with little company debt (other than the notes created to be sold to outside investors). Their company value dropped to as low as $1.5 billion this week, which means the company itself could technically be bought for $700 million. (Less than a year ago, the company was worth over $5 billion.) A mega financial institution like Wells Fargo or J.P. Morgan Chase could easily buy the entire company (and keep servicing the notes) if the value dropped further. I believe the LC platform still has real value, but if trust erodes further then it may need the backing of a bigger name. Then we’d be full-circle, the former peer-to-peer lender now owned by Wall Street. I’m not saying such an acquisition is likely, but instead something that would happen well before bankruptcy.

At the same time, unlikely is not zero. I would not put any more than 5% of my net worth into LC notes. I had great hope for LendingClub, but also never put more than a few percent of my net worth into LC notes. Here is my post on liquidating my LendingClub notes on the secondary market. I have no position in LC stock either, as I sold my shares immediately after the LendingClub IPO. I’m just watching this one from the sidelines.

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